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It  has often been argued that "artificial" limitations on durability1 tend 
to  be  associated with  monopoly elements in  an  economy.  A  straight- 
forward expression of this idea was given by Chamberlin (1957, p.  132): 
"The producer  has to face the question of how durable to make his prod- 
uct. Evidently if he makes it too durable, as soon as people have bought 
one unit they will not need another for a substantial period during which 
there will be no repeat demand for his product. He has an interest then in 
making it less durable so that people will come back that much sooner to 
buy another unit." 
On the other hand, since a monopolistic producer is  being considered, 
it  is  not  clear why  increases in  price cannot  serve equally  as  well  as 
reductions in durability. As a heuristic argument, if unit production costs 
do  not  diminish with  decreased durability  (the  case  considered here), 
costs of production would be lower when price, rather than durability, is 
the  instrument for maximizing revenue (because lower  replacement ex- 
penditure is  involved).  Therefore, at  least  to  the extent  that durability 
can be varied without affecting unit production costs, a profit-maximizing 
monopolist would choose the maximum durability.2 
The above argument turns out to depend on an implicit assumption of 
perfect capital markets. In particular, the argument is  valid if producers 
of durable goods employ the same discount rate for their profit flow that 
is used by owners of durables in discounting their flow of  rental income. 
When the discount rate of owners is above that of producers, the owners 
are relatively more sensitive to shifts in price and relatively less sensitive 
I  am  grateful  for  helpful  comments  from  Peter  Swan  and  from  the  referee.  Na- 
tional  Science  Foundation  grant  GS-3246  supported  this  research. 
I In  this  paper durability  is  assumed  to  be variable  at  zero  cost  up  to  some  ceiling 
value.  Therefore,  the  choice  of  any  durability  below  the  maximum  constitutes  what 
is  referred to  here as  contrived  depreciation.  In  the  general  case  the  choice  of  dura- 
bility  would  take  into  account  the  cost  of  varying  durability  and  contrived  depre- 
ciation  could  be  measured  as  the  gap  from  the  durability  chosen  under  perfect 
competition.  Planned  obsolescence  is  closely  related  to  contrived  depreciation,  but 
this  phenomenon  is  not  treated  explicitly  in  this  paper. 
2This  conclusion  has  been  formally  demonstrated  by  Swan  (1970)  in  the  context 
of  a  perfect  capital  market.  He  notes  (p.  884):  "The  choice  of  durability  by  a  mo- 
nopolist  is  essentially  one  of  minimizing  the  cost  of  the  provision  of  any  given 
service  flow  from  a  stock  of  durable  goods." 
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to  shifts in  durability. In  this case  some amount of  reduced durability 
(contrived depreciation) may be consistent with a monopolist's maximiza- 
tion of  profit, even when unit production costs are independent of  dur- 
ability. 
The above arguments are established formally within the fairly simple 
framework  discussed  below. 
1.  Household  Behavior 
Households are assumed to be both the owners and the users of durables, 
with firms monopolizing the sale of durables to  households.3 The  utility 
of each household depends on the flow of consumables, z, and on the flow 
of  services, V. from the single type of  durable good. The  stock of  dur- 
ables is denoted by K, and the service flow (per unit of time)  is assumed 
to be proportional to the stock: 
vt  =  yK  (y >  0)  (1 
Consumables  have a price pz, and durables, a price Pk.  Both prices are 
regarded by  consumers as  constant over time. Household income is  ex- 
ogenous and constant and equal to y dollars per unit of time. Durables are 
assumed to depreciate at the constant rate b. The discount rate applied by 
households to future cash flows is assumed to be constant and equal to rv. 
For simplicity, the utility function is assumed to be such that the repre- 
sentative  household desires constant  flows of  consumables and  durable 
services over time.4  If  the household begins at  time 0  without a  stock 
of durables,  it must initially purchase the stock amount, k -  v/y,  in order 
to  obtain  the  service flow,  V.5 Subsequently, the  household purchases 
sufficient durables to maintain the stock at k. The  flow purchase of dur- 
ables subsequent to  the initial  stock purchase is,  therefore, 
I =  8K  =-.V  (2) 
3 An  alternative  arrangement  would  have  firms  producing  and  owning  durables 
and  monopolizing  the  sale  of  services  to  households.  A  comparison  of  different 
ownership  arrangements  would  be  an  interesting  extension  of  the  analysis. 
4 If  each  household  maximizes 
T 
f  u(v,  z)e-Pt  dt, 
0 
where  p  is  the  direct  discount  rate  on  utility  and  T  is  the  length  of  the  planning 
horizons  constancy  of  v  and  (for  individual  household)  follows  if  p  rh.  How- 
ever,  constancy  of  v  and  z  in  the  aggregate  follows  if  the  economy  is  in  a  steady 
state  and  does  not  require each  individual  to  plan  for  constant  v  and  z  over  time. 
5The  model  could  be  complicated  to  include  an  arbitrary  initial  stock  of  durables. 
However,  it  is  crucial to  consider  the  stock  demand  for  durables as  well  as  the  flow 
(replacement)  demand.  A  complete  neglect  of  the  stock  demand  led  some  previous 
authors  into  erroneous  conclusions. 6oo  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
At  time 0,  the household makes a lump-sum purchase of  the  amount 
pk(v/y).  The flow of  expenditure at  all other times is  that  for replace- 
ment of durables, Pkb(V/Y),  plus the flow purchase of  consumables, paz. 
The intertemporal budget constraint is, therefore (assuming a zero initial 
stock of wealth), 
X  QO 
Pk-+  j(Pk  +  PZZ e-rhtdt  =fye-rht  dt, 
0  0 
or, simplifying, 
(rh  +  6) v +pZz  y.  (3) 
'y 
In equation (3),  the price of durable services is effectively 
PV - P(rh  + b).  (4) 
y 
The  household chooses a  flow of  consumables and a  flow of  durable 
services to maximize utility, subject to its budget constraint. The  formal 
optimization problem is:  Max:  u(z,  v);  subject  to  equation  (3).  The 
demand function for durable services that emerges from this optimization 
can be written as 
Ed  =  d  P_  _) 
y 
- =:V  -I  (5) 
PZ  PZ 
where pt  is  indicated in  equation  (4).  Equation  (5)  implies  that  the 
representative household's stock demand for durables is 
Kd  =V  d  _  _)  .  (6) 
Y  Y  PZIPz 
The  (absolute)  elasticity  of  demand for  capital  goods with  respect to 
pVpZ  is 
___  _  __  -_  pt' 
=  Kd  l(ppz)  - pz > 0.  (7) 
The  flow demand for durables subsequent to  the initial purchase cor- 
responds to the replacement necessary to maintain the stock at K4: 
Id  -  bK-d=_  (-i-)  (8) 
The important property of the demand functions in equations (6)  and 
(8)  is the form in which Pk, rh, and 8 enter. In particular, vd (and there- COMMUNICATIONS  6o I 
fore  Kd)  depends  only  on  the  combination  PI -  (pk/Y)  (rh +  8).  The 
flow demand, Id, depends separately on 8 as well as on PI. 
2.  Firm  Behavior 
The durable goods producer is assumed to be a monopolist who is aware 
of  the household demand functions in  equations (6)  and  (8).  For con- 
venience, production of K is assumed to take place at constant marginal 
cost, c (see n. 7). The depreciation rate, b, of the durable is assumed to be 
a  choice variable of  the  firm, subject to  the  constraint 8  - 8  0.  In 
order to focus on the polar case of contrived depreciation, variations in 8 
(above  some  minimum,  8o)  are assumed  to  have  no  effect  on  unit  produc- 
tion costs. The question, then, is whether firms would ever choose a b in 
excess of  be, since this choice would amount to  a pure case  of  socially 
uneconomic limitation on durability. 
At  the initial date, firms sell  the stock of  durables given by  Kd (eq. 
[6]).  Subsequently, firms produce and sell  according to  85Kd  (eq.  [8]). 
Assuming that firms choose a single pair of output price and depreciation 
rate, (Pk, 8),  to apply for all time, and assuming the firm's discount rate 
to be rf,6 the firm's optimization problem (ignoring any fixed costs,) is 
Max: it  -  P  )  (k-cK-f  t 
0 
or, carrying out the integration, 
Max: n =  (Pk-C)  1 +1-  K,  (9) 
subject  to  equation  (6):  K  -  Kd  (Pv/P:,  Y). 
The  first-order conditions for  the  maximization problem in  equation 
(9),  subject to K  -  Kd, may be expressed as:7 
p*  =  (10) 
k  [ (rZ,/rt)  WIJ  }  (11) 
6 The  discount  rate  of  households,  rh,  will  tend  to  exceed  that  of  firms  because 
borrowing  rates of  individuals  tend  to  exceed  both  individual  lending  rates  and  bor- 
rowing  rates  of  firms.  In  this  regard, see  Hirshleifer  (1958). 
7 If  unit  cost  is  a  function  of  durability,  c =  c(b),  c'(8)  )  0,  the  first-order  maxi- 
mization  condition  can  be  written  as: 
*  f[rh/rf)  -  C'(  ) 
1r-1  c(b) 
The  condition  c'(6)  <  0 implies that  b*  will  be  above  the  level  indicated  in  eq.  (11). 602  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
where a] is defined in equation (7). 
Equation (10)  yields a profit-maximizing  price only if  the monopolist 
is operating in the elastic region of  the demand curve where q >  1. The 
optimal value of  b is constrained according to  -  80 -  0. The solution 
indicated in equation  (11)  is  positive  when  q >  1 only  if  the demand 
elasticity  is  such  that  (rh/rf) >  q 1.  If  (r/rf)  I  1  (and  q >  1),  in- 
creases in  8  invariably reduce n.  Therefore, if  the  household discount 
rate is equal to or less than the firm's discount rate,  the optimal value of 
'  is  the  constant  value,  -  ,  and  contrived  depreciation  (  >  bo)  is 
non-optimal. 
If rl/lr  is sufficiently above unity, b* in equation (11)  will exceed bo, 
and  some  amount  of  limited  durability  will  characterize the  profit- 
maximizing solution, 
To  summarize, the combination of monopoly with an imperfect capital 
market (where rh >  rf) can lead to a rational (that is, profit-maximizing) 
basis  for  contrived depreciation. However,  the  existence  of  a  perfect 
capital market (rh  rf)  precludes a rational basis for this type  of limi- 
tation on durability, even in the presence of monopoly.8 
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